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UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK
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VOLUME 6 1983 NUMBER 4
"ISAAC PARKER, BILL SIKES AND
THE RULE OF LAW"*
William H Rehnquist * *
Asked about a recent increase in murders within his jurisdic-
tion, a trial judge said:
I attribute the increase to the reversal of the Supreme Court.
These reversals have contributed to the number of murders in the
Uurisdiction]. First of all, the convicted murderer has a long
breathing spell before his case comes before the Supreme Court.
Then, when it does come before that body, the conviction may be
quashed. And whenever it is quashed, it is always upon the flim-
siest technicalities. The Supreme Court never touches the merits
of the case.'
These comments might sound contemporary. Yet, they were
made by Judge Isaac C. Parker, who sat in Fort Smith, Arkansas, as
the district judge for the Western District of Arkansas from 1875
until 1896. Judge Parker had a distinguished career administering
justice, largely in what was then the Indian Territory, and some re-
marks upon that career will provide a useful introduction to a dis-
cussion of several different models of criminal justice. I first became
interested in Judge Parker some thirty years ago, at the time I was
serving as a law clerk to Justice Jackson. While doing research for
* From an address delivered for the Ben J. Altheimer Lecture Series at the University
of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law on September 23, 1983.
** Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court.
1. W. GARD, FRONTIER JUSTICE 289 (1949).
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an opinion, I came across a footnote in Dean Wigmore's Treatise on
the Law of Evidence which discussed some of Judge Parker's legal
rulings, noted that a number of them had been reversed by the
Supreme Court of the United States, and went on to observe that in
many of these instances Judge Parker had been right and the
Supreme Court wrong. These observations by a noted legal scholar
sufficiently piqued my curiosity that when I left Washington, bound
for a job in private practice in Phoenix, I stopped in Fort Smith for
four or five days in the summer of 1953 to examine what old court
records there were, and to go through the newspaper morgues which
dealt with the era in which Judge Parker had sat in Fort Smith. I
gathered some fascinating minutiae with a view to eventually writ-
ing a biography.
During that summer, however, I began work for a Phoenix law
firm and got married; somehow free time was in short supply for
several years. When I was finally ready to rework my notes, I dis-
covered that several books about Judge Parker had recently come
on the market, and that what had once been a novel idea would now
merely swell the tide. The book-length treatments of Judge Parker's
career vary in quality and character. A simple survey of titles suf-
fices to show their tenor. A contemporary "biography," using that
term loosely, was called: Hell on the Border. He Hanged Eighty-
eight Men ;2 and from that the other books have taken their tone.
Homer Croy's biography is entitled He Hanged Them High.: An Au-
thentic Account of the Fanatical Judge Who Hanged Eighty-eight
Men. 3 Fred Harrington's book, printed in 1951, is called simply
Hanging Judge,4 and so they go. The impression conveyed, at least
by the subtitles, is that Isaac Parker was the Indian Territory's
equivalent of Roy Bean west of the Pecos in Texas, with the impor-
tant exception that Judge Parker had the authority to impose a
death sentence; and that the authority was exercised with unbecom-
ing zeal.
This picture of Judge Parker is totally one-sided, and, to the
extent possible, the record should be set straight. Isaac Parker was
not an American version of England's "Bloody Jeffreys."5 Nor was
2. S. HARMAN, HELL ON THE BORDER: HE HANGED EIGHTY-EIGHT MEN (1953).
3. H. CROY, HE HANGED THEM HIGH: AN AUTHENTIC ACCOUNT OF THE FANATICAL
JUDGE WHO HANGED EIGHTY-EIGHT MEN (1952).
4. F. HARRINGTON, HANGING JUDGE (1951).
5. George Jeffreys, 1st Baron Jeffreys of Wem, 1645-89, was in charge of executing the
unpopular religious policy of the Roman Catholic King James II of England.
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he simply a frontier rustic who happened to be elected justice of the
peace, in the tradition of Roy Bean, Wyatt Earp, and the like.
Isaac Parker was born in Ohio in 1838, and after studying law
was admitted to the Ohio Bar in 1859. Later that same year he
moved to St. Joseph, Missouri, where he opened a law office, and
served, successively, as city attorney, circuit prosecutor, and state
circuit judge. In 1870, he was elected to Congress from the district
comprising the northwestern part of Missouri, and served two terms
in that body. Then, in 1875, President Grant named him to the post
of United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.
The judicial post to which Parker came in May, 1875, was a
remarkable one. Federal courts in those days had virtually no crim-
inal business, because Congress had enacted few criminal statutes.
The staple of almost every federal district court was diversity juris-
diction-lawsuits between people who lived in different states-and
months could go by without a criminal case coming to trial. But the
Western District of Arkansas, while it had the civil jurisdiction pos-
sessed by its sister district courts throughout the country, also had
criminal jurisdiction over the length and breadth of the Indian Ter-
ritory. And in 1875, the Indian Territory comprised virtually all of
what would later become the State of Oklahoma; throughout this
territory Isaac Parker sat as a criminal court trial judge. He had
jurisdiction over all offenses not triable by the Indian courts-and
the Indian courts were generally restricted to matters that involved
only Indians.
Another peculiarity of Judge Parker's court was that for the
first fifteen years of his career in Fort Smith, no appeal from his
criminal decisions was authorized; not even to the Supreme Court of
the United States. The typical appeals provision in the statutes at
those times simply did not contemplate a federal trial judge with the
criminal jurisdiction exercised by Judge Parker in the Western Dis-
trict of Arkansas.
The upshot of this, so far as those who appeared before Parker
in Fort Smith were concerned, is reminiscent of the old story about
the argument between the bishop and the judge as to who was more
powerful. The judge insisted that he was more powerful, because in
During the "Bloody Assizes" that followed the collapse (July 1685) of the insurrection
of James Scott, duke of Monmouth, Jeffreys prosectued the rebels with ferocity, executing
perhaps 150 to 200 persons and ordering hundreds of others sold into slavery in the colonies.
At the same time, he profited by extorting money from the victims.
THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, VOl. 5, 537 (1974).
19831
UALR LAW JOURNAL
extreme cases he could say to a defendant "you be hanged." The
bishop responded that he was more powerful, because he could say
to a man or woman "you be damned." To this the judge retorted,
"Yes, but when I say 'you be hanged,' you are hanged." Unlike the
long, drawn-out process of appeal accompanying the imposition of a
death sentence today, when Judge Parker said "you be hanged," you
were hanged, unless you were one of those rare defendants who was
able to obtain executive clemency from the President of the United
States. And while the President of the United States and his Attor-
ney General were not as busy in those days as are their present
counterparts, one may nonetheless assume that they did not devote
a great deal of their time to clemency applications from the Western
District of Arkansas.
The statement made earlier that the characterization of Judge
Parker as an ignorant zealot was entirely one-sided does not mean
that Judge Parker was not a "hanging judge." As that term is nor-
mally understood, there can be little doubt as to its applicability.
The following account of Parker's first two months on the bench
should give some indication of this:
The courtroom in which Judge Parker took up his gavel, on May
10, 1875, was on the first floor of a two-story brick building, situ-
ated inside the military garrison and previously used as a bar-
racks. Offices of the court attaches [sic] were on the same floor.
The musty, dungeon-like basement served as a jail. By the time
his first term ended, late in June, Parker had tried ninety-one
criminal cases. Of eighteen murder cases, fifteen had resulted in
conviction. The judge sentenced eight of the killers to be hanged
on September 3rd. The number dropped to six when one was
killed while trying to escape and another, because of his youth,
had his sentence commuted to life imprisonment and later was
pardoned.
The multiple hanging made a big day in Fort Smith. News-
paper reporters from Little Rock, Kansas City, and St. Louis
were on hand. Farmers and their families began pouring into
town early in the morning, crowding the streets by ten o'clock.
Many brought their lunches and went early to the courtyard to
have a favorable spot from which to view the major event. The
Western Independent, which issued an extra edition with the his-
tory of the condemned men and their crimes, estimated that five
thousand witnessed the hanging.6
The same author offers a statistical summary of Parker's tenure.
6. W. GARD, Supra note 1, at 283-84.
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In his twenty-one years on the federal bench at Fort Smith,
during fourteen of which no appeal could be taken from his deci-
sions, he tried more than thirteen thousand persons. More than
nine thousand of them were convicted. Of three hundred and
forty-four men convicted of crimes punishable by death, the
Judge sentenced one hundred and seventy-two to be hanged.
Fewer than half of the latter escaped the noose by dying in jail or
by obtaining commutation or Presidential reprieve.7
But the statistics tell only part of the story. To understand
Parker it is necessary to understand the Indian Territory in those
days. The Five Civilized Tribes had followed the "Trail of Tears"
from the southeastern part of the United States to establish separate
tribal governments in the eastern portion of what is now the State of
Oklahoma. After the Civil War, with all the dislocation and law-
lessness which inevitably follows such a conflict, fugitives, despera-
does, and ne'er-do-wells drifted into the Indian Territory. Because
it was difficult, if not impossible, to extradite them from this juris-
diction, it became known as "Robber's Roost." These criminals
preyed on Indians and whites alike, throughout the territory, and
they did so with impunity until, as the statistics indicate, they began
to furnish grist for Judge Parker's mill. After he had served less
than a year, one of the Fort Smith newspapers had this to say of him
editorially:
The certainty of punishment is the only sure preventive of
crime, and the administration of the laws by Judge I. C. Parker
has made him a terror to all evildoers in the Indian country. The
determination shown by the Judge that the law shall be faithfully
and fearlessly administered and the firmness he has displayed
during the less than twelve months he has sat on the bench have
won for him the confidence and respect of the members of the
Bar and our citizens, as well as of the law-abiding men of all
races in the Indian Territory.'
When the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States from the decisions of Judge Parker was first provided in 1890,
and broadened a few years later, many of his decisions were re-
versed on the basis of what laymen are wont to call "legal technical-
ities," that is, considerations unrelated to the ultimate question of
whether or not the defendant committed the crime with which he
was charged. It could be argued from the very fact of these reversals
7. Id at 285.
8. Western Independent (Fort Smith, Arkansas), Sept. 8, 1875.
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that Parker was wrong and that the Supreme Court was right; that,
at least, is the presumption in which lawyers are required to indulge
about a court of last resort. But in this connection, it may be well to
remember a comment of my one-time mentor, Justice Jackson. He
said of himself and his colleagues: "We were not declared to be
final because we are infallible, but we are declared to be infallible
because we are final."
It should be noted, also, that the Supreme Court some twenty
years after reversing one of Judge Parker's judgments in a case
called Crain v. United States,9 said of that case:
Technical objections of this character were undoubtedly
given much more weight formerly than they are now .... But
with improved methods of procedure and greater privileges to the
accused, any reason for such strict adherence to the mere formali-
ties of trial would seem to have passed away, and we think that
the better opinion. . . was expressed in the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking for the minority of the court in
the Crain case ...
Holding this view, notwithstanding our reluctance to over-
rule former decisions of this court, we are now constrained to
hold that the technical enforcement of formal rights in criminal
procedures sustained in the Crain case is no longer required in
the prosecution of offense under present systems of law. ... io
Dean Wigmore, in his monumental work on evidence, also criti-
cized several other opinions of the Supreme Court which had re-
versed decisions of Judge Parker, saying: "These cases, on the point
of presumption, were ill advised in their attempts to assume the po-
sition of monitor over a great and experienced trial judge."' l
Where might Judge Parker's court-let us say prior to its right
of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States-fit within the
spectrum of varying modes of administration of a system of criminal
justice? In that court, the procedures were admittedly summary by
today's standards; but one still had a judge appointed by the Presi-
dent of the United States and confirmed by the Senate, a jury of
twelve persons, and generally the services of an attorney. How does
that stack up with other modes of administering criminal justice re-
flected in literature and history?
Charles Dickens, in his novel Oliver Twist, presents a profitable
9. 162 U.S. 625 (1896).
10. Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642, 646-47 (1914).
11. J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 276, at 116 n. 3 (2d ed. 1940).
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comparison with his description of how a character named Bill
Sikes met his death. Bill Sikes was a sordid criminal in nineteenth-
century London, vividly brought to life by Dickens. He was always
accompanied by his dog, and the dog was even uglier than Bill
Sikes. Bill's culminating act of depravity is the brutal murder of his
paramour Nancy, whom he first pistol whips and then clubs to
death. He flees London, but returns to hide out in a house in Ja-
cob's Island, a bad part of town along the Thames. Ensconced there
with his fellow cutthroats from a London housebreaking ring, Sikes
learns that his presence has been discovered by a mob of outraged
citizens. In Dickens' words:
There were lights gleaming below, voices in loud and earnest
conversation, the tramp of hurried footsteps-endless they
seemed in number--crossing the nearest wooden bridge. One
man on horseback seemed to be among the crowd; for there was
the noise of hooves rattling on the uneven pavement. The gleam
of lights increased; the footsteps came more thickly and noisily
on. Then, came a loud knocking at the door, and then a hoarse
murmur from such a multitude of angry voices as would have
made the boldest quail. 2
Sikes throws up the sash of a window and tells the crowd, "Do
your worst! I'll cheat you yet!"' 3 Then, again in Dickens' words:
Of all the terrific yells that ever fell on mortal ears, none
could exceed the cry of the infuriated throng. Some shouted to
those who were nearest to set the house on fire; others roared to
the officers to shoot him dead. Among them all, none showed
such fury as the man on horseback, who, throwing himself out of
the saddle, and bursting through the crowds as if he were parting
water, beneath the window, in a voice that rose above all others,
'Twenty guineas to the man who brings a ladder!'
The nearest voices took up the cry, and hundreds echoed it.
Some called for ladders, some for sledge-hammers; some ran
with torches to and fro as if to seek them, and still came back and
roared again; some spent their breath in impotent curses and exe-
crations; some pressed forward with the ecstasy of madmen, and
thus impeded the progress of those below; some among the
boldest attempted to climb up by the waterspout and crevices in
the wall; and all waved to and fro, in the darkness beneath, like a
field fo corn moved by an angry wind: and joined from time to
12. C. DICKENS, OLIVER TwIST 504 (Dodd, Mead & Co., N.Y. 1941).
13. Id. at 505.
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time in one loud furious roar.14
Sikes, determined to cheat both the crowd and law, decides to
lower himself into a ditch at the back of the house, on the side away
from the crowd. He climbs out onto the roof with a length of rope,
fastens one end to a chimney, and makes a running noose of the
other. But just as he stands at the edge, lifting the rope over his
head, he sees a terrifying vision of Nancy's eyes, tumbles over the
parapet with the noose around his neck and hangs himself.
The denouncement is splendid; but it neatly avoids the juris-
prudential problems that inhere in the situation. That's probably
why Charles Dickens was a novelist and not a lawyer. But the
reader knows all there is to be known about Bill Sikes, after reading
more than four hundred pages of Oliver Twist. A man with scarcely
a redeeming virtue other than his affection for his dog-and he was
even willing to kill his dog when he thought that the dog might give
him away to his pursuers-a confirmed housebreaker and petty
criminal of the London underworld, fresh from the premeditated
killing of the woman who had shared his bed and board for a
number of years. What if as Bill Sikes stood on that roof of the
house in Jacobs Island, the reader was presented with two alterna-
tive futures for him; either the mob would succeed in breaking into
the house and lynching him, or he would succeed, once he dropped
into the ditch, in sailing away from England and escaping punish-
ment altogether? Whicn alternative is better?
The question, of course, is a bit too hypothetical. Only the
reader of a Dickens novel can know with certainty that Bill Sikes
has the blood of Nancy on his hands; that there can be no case of
mistaken identity; and that there are no mitigating circumstances
that might have been presented in his defense at trial. No person
would prefer lynching by a mob to a trial under the law of the land;
but if there was a choice between lynching or escape for Bill Sikes,
at least some of us may ponder. Lawyers will say, of course, that it
is not enough for a defendant merely to be "known"-whatever that
word may mean in this context-to be guilty; he must be proven
guilty in accordance with the requirements of established law. But
that answer doesn't fit this case. In the scene from Oliver Twist the
persecutors are not some "Bloody Jeffreys" wrongly condemning a




vate individuals. To put it in terms of fourteenth amendment analy-
sis, there does not appear to be any "state action."
In considering this episode from Oliver Twist and the questions
it raises, it is important to recall the history of vigilante justice in the
United States. The term "vigilante," the dictionary states, comes
from the Spanish word meaning watchman or guard.' 5 Such
"watchmen" appeared in many western states during frontier times.
But unlike mere "lynch mobs," who go about their mission contrary
to the organized course of the law, most of these vigilante groups
operated at a time when there almost literally was no "law" in the
area involved.
Take for example, the vigilante movement in California during
and shortly after the Gold Rush. Improvised courts were present at
many of the early California diggings. They were initially formed
to handle civil problems, such as the size of claims, rules governing
abandonment, and the like. Soon, however, crime became a serious
problem in the camps, and the miners' courts of necessity expanded
their jurisdiction.
In the smaller camps, guilt and punishment might be deter-
mined by the whole assembly of miners. In the larger mining com-
munities, this responsibility was usually delegated to a jury;
sometimes the defendant was even assigned counsel. But the trials
were always swift and informal. Because there were no jails, penal-
ties were usually limited to banishment, whipping, or hanging.
Technicalities were dispensed with, and punishments were carried
out without delay or appeal. In general, summary justice of this sort
met with approval, even in the East, as necessary to save the mining
camps from anarchy.
In camps without even a miners' court, maintenance of order
often depended on a voluntary "committee of vigilance." In some
instances the committee was one of long tenure. In others, it dis-
banded as soon as its immediate task was completed, and a new one
formed when the next emergency arose.
The vigilance committees had their highest development in San
Francisco, the chief point of entry for the gold seekers and center of
miners' outfitters, saloons, and gambling halls. By the end of 1850,
San Francisco had nearly fifty thousand inhabitants and attracted
criminals from the world over. 16
15. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2551 (4th ed. 1976).
16. "More than a hundred persons were murdered within a few months; yet not one of
the killers was punished. Local officers and courts seemed helpless. The few thugs arrested
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Finally, a vigilance committee was formed by the leading citi-
zens. The constitution and bylaws of the committee were published
in local newspapers. The same day, June 13, 1851, the committee
caught, tried and hanged its first victim to almost universal acclaim.
Local officials made no effort to dissolve the growing organization,
and the hangings continued. One newspaper, taking what appeared
to be the general view, asked: "Whenever the law becomes an
empty name, has not the citizen the right to supply its deficiency?"
As a result of the committee's activities many criminals left the
city. Others were banished on threat of hanging. And the commit-
tee tried to prevent the immigration of criminals by boarding each
incoming vessel to examine passengers and check their records.
Soon city and county officials were able to keep order by them-
selves, and there was less need for the vigilantes. The committee
still retained jurisdiction over more serious offenders, even to the
point of taking them by force from local officials. But activities di-
minished until, in early 1853, the committee went out of existence,
as did committees in other California communities patterned after
the one in San Francisco.
By the spring of 1855, however, crime and corruption were
again prevalent. When one machine politician murdered a United
States Marshal and then "fixed" the ensuing legal proceedings, and
another murdered a newspaper publisher, the committee rebounded
with a double hanging. It remained in action for three months, dur-
ing which there were only two murders in San Francisco, as com-
pared with more than one hundred during the six months before the
committee was formed. Desperadoes were hanged or deported until
a semblance of order was restored. Again, the committee gradually
went out of business as statutory courts became more effective.
The Gold Rush experience was by no means unique. "Prairie
necktie parties" were common throughout the western territories,
where a horse thief was considered as bad as, if not worse than, a
murderer and where formal justice was ineffective if not nonexis-
tent. The work of these vigilantes made orderly settlement possible
and paved the way for effective courts and enforcement agencies. In
the words of one commentator:
As a rule, the vigilantes, especially those in organized groups, got
promptly hired shyster lawyers, who usually kept them out of jail. It was almost impossible
to find witnesses to a crime who dared to testify against the culprits. If prosecution witnesses
were in prospect, defense lawyers sometimes had the trial delayed until they could be
killed." W. GARD, supra note 1, at 154.
494 [Vol. 6:485
RULE OF LAW
out their ropes only in cases in which guilt was clear. Most of the
committees disbanded quickly when law enforcement officers
and formal courts became able to preserve order and to protect
lives and property. They had served their purpose in discourag-
ing crime in the interim before statutory law caught up with the
frontier. In much of the West, that catching up came in slow and
halting steps.' 7
Most would agree that statutory law has by now caught up
with, if not wholly eliminated, the frontier. But vigilante justice is
still with us in some parts of the country. Last August, the Wall
Street Journal ran an editorial entitled "Vigilante Justice,"18 in
which it recited several recent incidents. In Buffalo, a man kid-
napped and raped a ten-year old girl. The girl's enraged father,
leading a mob of two dozen others, captured the rapist, beat him,
and plunged a knife into his stomach, wounding him. In Greenwich
Village, the citizens, following the lead of other anti-crime groups
throughout the city, have organized to drive transvestite prostitutes
out of their neighborhood. And in California, 62,500 voters signed
a petition urging cancellation of a parole award to a man convicted
thirteen years ago of murdering a boy and raping three other peo-
ple. The Governor overruled the parole board's decision, only to
have his own decision set aside by a California appeals court which
likened the petition process to a "Roman circus, where the roar of
the crowd would determine the life or death of the gladiator." 9
Some would say, with the California appeals court, that be-
cause vigilante action takes place wholly outside the legal frame-
work, it is not really a mode of administering criminal justice at all.
But it may be useful to regard vigilante justice as standing at one
end of a broad spectrum. And even at that end, distinctions must be
made. At the pole, lies spontaneous mob action, such as that in Buf-
falo. The dangers of such action, without even the semblance of a
trial, are clearly portrayed by Walter van Tilburg Clark in the clas-
sic western novel The Ox-Bow Incident.2 ° In that book, a group of
cowboys captures three men believed guilty of cattle rustling and
murder. Relying on strong circumstantial evidence, the cowboys re-
fuse to wait even for the few hours that it would take to corroborate
the implausible exculpatory story offered by the suspects. They
17. W. GARD, supra note 1, at 213.
18. Vigilante Justice, Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1983, at 20, col. 1.
19. In Re Fain, 139 Cal. App. 3d 295, 306, 188 Cal. Rptr. 653, 661 (1983) (quoting the
trial court).
20. W. CLARK, THE Ox-Bow INCIDENT (1942).
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hang the three men only to discover, half an hour later, that they
were innocent.
The miners' courts and vigilance committees scattered through-
out the western territories provided surer procedures for for deter-
mining guilt and innocence. They constituted the transition to a
formal system of justice such as prevailed in Judge Parker's court in
the Western District of Arkansas for the twenty years in which he
sat there. Judge Parker's trials were swift, and there was no appeal,
but the fundamentals of due process were undoubtedly present.
Dickens neatly portrays this transition, capturing both the simi-
larities and distinctions between the two modes of administering
criminal justice. In the chapter following Bill Sikes' death, Dickens
describes the trial of Fagin, who operated a notorious school for
pickpockets. Unlike Sikes, Fagin was tried before an English judge
and jury; but in England in the time of Dickens, just as in the
United States in the time of Isaac Parker, there was no right of ap-
peal from a judge's sentence of death based upon a jury verdict.
And the time between verdict and sentence was short, as may be
gathered from the following passage:
At length there was cry of silence, and a breathless look from all
towards the door. The jury returned, and passed him close. He
could glean nothing from their faces; they might as well have
been of stone. Perfect stillness ensued-not a rustle-not a
breath--Guilty.
The building rang with a tremendous shout, and another,
and another, and then it echoed loud groans, that gathered
strength as they swelled out, like angry thunder. It was a peal of
joy from the populace outside, greeting the news that he would
die on Monday.
21
The other end of the spectrum is fairly represented by the judi-
cial history of a man named Jimmy Lee Gray, who was executed by
the State of Mississippi on September 2, 1983, after the Supreme
Court of the United States denied a last minute stay by a vote of six
to three. In October, 1976, Gray was indicted for capital murder.
At trial, the state proved that in that year Gray had abducted a three
year old girl, carried her to a remote area, and after sexually mo-
lesting her, suffocated her in a muddy ditch and threw her body into
a stream. He was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to death.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, however,
21. C. DICKENS, supra note 11, at 527.
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Gray's conviction was reversed and he was awarded a new trial.22
The new trial took place in 1978, and he was again convicted of
capital murder and again sentenced to death. This time the
Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the conviction and sen-
tence.23 The United States Supreme Court refused to review the
case in 1980.24
One might think the case would end there. But as anyone fa-
miliar with modem habeas procedures will know, there followed a
series of collateral attacks on both the conviction and sentence that
lasted over three years.25 When the final plea for a last minute stay
reached the United States Supreme Court,26 judicial action review-
ing the case had been taken eighty-two times by twenty-six different
state and federal judges. And in none of those proceedings was the
guilt of Jimmy Lee Gray ever called into question.
Many will sympathize with the view expressed by Chief Justice
Burger in explaining his vote to deny the stay application. "This
case," he wrote, "illustrates a recent pattern of calculated efforts to
frustrate valid judgments after painstaking judicial review over a
number of years; at some point there must be finality. '27 This arti-
cle does not intend to suggest that there should be a return to the
days of Dickens or Judge Parker, when one man had such un-
checked control over the fate of others. But one question should be
raised: At what point should there be finality? Where along the
spectrum of possible systems of administering criminal justice
should our system come to rest?
The difficulty with the question, of course, is that a system of
criminal justice must simultaneously satisfy confficting demands.
At a minimum, the goal of any rational system must be to vindicate
the rule of law by apprehending and punishing the guilty and by
exonerating the innocent. This goal requires careful consideration
of each individual case to ensure that fair procedures were used to
reach a sound result. But it also requires that a final decision be
reached in each case as expeditiously as is reasonably possible. If
22. Gray v. State, 351 So. 2d 1342 (Miss. 1977), aF1 'd 375 So. 2d 994 (Miss. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 912 (1980).
23. Gray v. State, 375 So. 2d 994 (Miss. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980), reh'g
denied, 448 U.S. 912 (1980).
24. Gray v. Mississippi, 446 U.S. 998 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 912 (1980).
25. Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1982), reh'g denied, 685 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1886 (1983), reh'g denied, 103 S. Ct. 3099 (1983), reh'g denied,
710 F.2d 1048 (1983), reh'g denied, 714 F.2d 137 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 211 (1983).
26. Gray v. Lucas, 104 S.Ct. 211 (1983).
27. Id at 213.
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the sole virtue of a system of administering criminal justice were its
capacity for examining and reexamining the fairness and the ade-
quacy of the process by which a defendant were found guilty, there
could be little quarrel with present-day delays and the lack of final-
ity in criminal judgments. But such examination is not, and cannot
by the only concern of a criminal justice system; another concern, at
least as important, is to ensure that offenders against the laws of
society will be punished, and punished without unreasonable delays.
The frequent resort to vigilante justice, not only in frontier
days, but also in the recent examples cited in the Wall Street Jour-
nal,28 suggests the importance of this societal imperative. The spec-
tacle of an angry mob impatient of the "law's delays," is not a
pleasant one; particularly if the "law's delays" about which they
complain are merely the rudimentary requirements of a trial in
some manner authorized by law. But interminable delays in the
criminal justice process, or final decisions, issued many years after
the initial trial, that set free a criminal defendant for reasons other
than doubt about his established guilt are spectacles equally un-
palatable to many members of society.
Most laymen can understand why the law requires that a crimi-
nal defendant be tried before an impartial jury and an impartial
judge; that he be chargeable only with a violation of the law as it
existed at the time he acted; and that he have a lawyer to assist him
in defending against the charges. These requirements have been
written into the United States Constitution by the process of amend-
ment, and therefore bespeak the views of the majority of the people
of the country at the time the amendments in question were enacted.
The heat of passion which occasionally motivates people 'within our
system to demand some form of justice more summary than this
should be resisted not merely by judges and lawyers, but by every
thinking citizen. But the view that our system of criminal justice
exists merely to safeguard the rights of the defendant, whatever the
cost in delaying or frustrating justice, is equally one-sided and ulti-
mately, equally dangerous.
There must, of course, be concern with the right of an accused
defendant to a fair trial. Such a right is fundamental in any civi-
lized society. Equally important, however, is the principle that the
moral imperatives embodied in enacted criminal laws be obeyed,
and that their transgressors be apprehended and punished. While
this principle extends to all enacted laws, it has particular force with
28. Vigilante Justice, supra note 16.
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respect to the laws punishing murder. Such laws have an authority
all their own; they reflect more than the transient views of a particu-
lar legislature. The laws against murder embody moral judgments
common to almost every major religion on the face of the earth. To
the extent that any legislative judgement may be said to have in-
dependent moral sanction, the judgment against the unlawful taking
of the life of another human being has such sanction.
Whether one views the nature of society as essentially contrac-
tual, after the manner of some political philosophers, or as organic,
after the manner of others, makes little difference to this point. If it
be true, as Hobbes said, that life in the state of nature is "nasty,
brutish, and short," surely one of the prime reasons people enter
into the social contract is to attain a higher degree of personal secur-
ity than they had without any government. If, on the other hand,
government is thought to have a more organic basis, society is emi-
nently justified in punishing those who breach a canon of conduct
which has endured for centuries.
In sum, it is wholly inaccurate to say that a government or a
society ought to be measured primarily by the way in which it ac-
cords due process of law to its criminal defendants. This is un-
doubtedly a very important measure; but equally important is the
extent to which a society succeeds in vindicating the moral judg-
ments of its members as they are embodied in its criminal laws. A
breakdown in the criminal justice system leads eventually to a state
of anarchy, and no society will long tolerate anarchy. The careers of
Isaac Parker, Bill Sikes, and Fagin all testify to this indisputable
fact.
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